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Abstract: 
This paper aims to challenge simplifications on race and racism in contemporary 
Turkish society. In doing so, it draws a macro-historical context wherein the racist 
component of the Turkish national identity had been shaped. The paper traces the 
emergence of the core racist elements in the beginning at the 20th century within the 
ideology propagated by the organisation of the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları). The 
Turkish History Thesis with its emphasis on ‘race’ attempted to promote not only an 
affiliation but also a common ancestry between Turkish and Western Civilisation. 
These arguments were backed by commissioning research carried out in the fields of 
Anthropology, Archaeology and Linguistics. The main argument of this paper is that 
the racist components of the national identity in Turkey have been the product of a 
Eurocentric understanding of world history by consecutive nationalist leaders.  
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An important but significantly under-researched theme of Turkish national identity 
over the course of the last 100 years has been its racist elements. Indeed, historians 
and other social scientists have paid little attention to the racist and racial elements 
in the shaping of the Turkish national identity. The scholars that have examined 
related issues seem to have solely focused on Turkish state’s treatment of its own 
ethnic minorities, notably the Kurds, the Armenians, the Jewish population of 
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Turkey and the Greeks. Many official accounts and historical narratives of Turkish 
nationalism and its practices omit to fully grasp the development of the ideas based 
on Turkishness as a ‘pure race’. The historical construction of race could be 
examined as a wider system of power and oppression. The denotations of any given 
race are not static as they reside in the juncture of politics in that historical context. 
To provide a framework for a better understanding of the permanence of these 
phenomena we should look at the global racial hierarchy.  
A racial hierarchy is a system of stratification that concentrates on the 
conviction that some racial groups are either superior or inferior to other racial 
groups. The groups identified to have the most power and influence are at the top of 
the racial hierarchy, while the groups recognized to be inferior are at the bottom. A 
global racial hierarchy in which white Europeans were considered inherently 
superior to all other ‘races’ in practically every respect was central for colonial/ 
imperialist expansion in all parts of the world, as well as for the formation and system 
of slavery. Without the declared conviction that white people are superior – 
intellectually, spiritually, artistically – than non-white people, it would not have been 
conceivable to subordinate and dehumanize subjugated peoples. In the world today, 
there still appears to be a reasonably common opinion, both among academics and 
the wider public, that white Europeans / Americans are at the top of this racial 
hierarchy.  Martin Jacques explains the reasons for this as follows: 
At the top of this hierarchy are whites. The reasons are 
deep-rooted and profound. White societies have been the 
global top dogs for half a millennium, ever since Chinese 
civilisation went into decline. With global hegemony, first 
with Europe and then the US, whites have long 
commanded respect, as well as arousing fear and 
resentment, among other races. Being white confers a 
privilege, a special kind of deference, throughout the 
world, be it Kingston, Hong Kong, Delhi, Lagos - or even, 
despite the way it is portrayed in Britain, Harare. Whites 
are the only race that never suffers any kind of systemic 
racism anywhere in the world. And the impact of white 
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racism has been far more profound and baneful than any 
other: it remains the only racism with global reach.1 
Racism is a modern phenomenon and a product of the capitalist system.2 According 
to Wallerstein race, and therefore racism, is the ‘expression, the promoter and the 
consequence of geographical concentrations associated with the axial division of 
labour’.3 As such racism should be conceived as a global process embedded in a 
hierarchical development of the world-system. Racial categories are a social 
construction and have always form a global hierarchy. Yet, as race is a dynamic and 
fluid construct, the names and the boundaries of the categories are in regular flux 
adjusting to new circumstances and changing interactions with various 
manifestations of power. In particular, ‘white race’ and ‘whiteness’ constantly 
modifies their meaning by including different groups. 
In this paper, the over emphasis of, and even obsession with, ‘whiteness’ in 
early definitions of Turkish identity should be scrutinised as a by-product of 
Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism is the discourse that places emphasis on European 
concerns, culture and values at the expense of those of other cultures. Eurocentrism 
as a practice is a modern phenomenon that dates back to the sixteenth century, the 
period of the Renaissance, and emerges most strongly in the nineteenth century and 
gains further momentum in academia in the twentieth century. Samir Amin 
considers Eurocentrism as an ideological distortion and thus describes it as a world 
view fabricated by the domination of Western capitalism that claims European 
culture reflects the unique and most progressive manifestation of the metaphysical 
order of history.4 One of the most fundamental myths of Eurocentrism is the so-
called European miracle, also known as the Great Divergence, the process where 
European countries gradually grew to become the most powerful global economies. 
Traditionally the great narrative of the rise of Western civilisation attributed 
European success to cultural values, social institutions and political practices. 
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Eurocentric narrative stresses the culture and institutions of European 
‘exceptionalism’ that led to the industrial growth of Northwest Europe. On the 
contrary, revisionist historians who challenged the Eurocentric narrative argue that 
the European miracle should be considered as a process that emerged in the 
nineteenth century due to two fortuitous circumstances: convenient coal supplies 
and access to the abundance of the New World.5 This view focuses on a more global 
context in order to place the so-called European miracle within the evolving patterns 
of global economic and cultural interaction.6 
While Eurocentrism should not be equated with racism, a Eurocentric 
approach to world history can provide a solid basis for the development of racist 
ideas. The so-called modernisation project delivered by Kemalist reforms in the first 
two decades of the Republic’s lifespan was formed with a purely Eurocentric 
assumption of modernity and progress.  
In order to understand the shape that the Turkish national identity took in 
the emergence of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 we should trace its historical 
trajectory in a global context. Historians point out the 1683 military defeat in Vienna 
of the Ottoman army as a turning point for the history of the empire. In the relevant 
literature the siege of Vienna marks the beginning of the relative decline of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Eurocentric literature and public discourse in the nineteenth 
century referred to the Ottoman state as the ‘sick man of Europe’. The root of the 
Ottoman decline attributed to intellectual and cultural backwardness.7 By 
attributing to the so-called ‘European miracle’, and its cultural and racial 
characteristics, the same literature perceived the Ottoman and Islamic world as 
culturally ‘inferior’. The binary opposition between the ‘dynamic’ and the ‘static’ was 
a recurrent theme in the Eurocentric narrative of the world. 
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This paper argues that Kemalism developed its reforms by blindly adopting 
Eurocentric racist assumptions. Kemalism can be perceived as the extension of 
certain ideas on global development and race initially emerged in the nineteenth 
century. The theory and ideology of Turkism has been developed on these 
Eurocentric explanations for the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the assumption 
of the superiority of the Western civilization. The wide-spread belief was that only by 
dogmatically embracing the so-called western values and political and economic 
systems the Turkish state would regain its power.  
 
Mislabelling Kemalism in Civic and/or Ethnic nationalism terms 
Hans Kohn’ classic typology of ‘liberal civic Western’ / ‘illiberal ethnic Eastern 
nationalism’ symbolises the epitome of Eurocentric biases in the academic field of 
studies of nationalism.8 This typology is so well established that many scholars still 
apply these sharp distinctions in studies of empirical cases. The case of Kemalism in 
Turkey is not an exception to this academic tradition. Few critical scholars like the 
Marxist Perry Anderson perceive that Kemalism represented a purely ethnic type of 
nationalism that was intentionally masqueraded as civic.9 Studies are very reluctant 
to characterise Kemalism as purely ethnic and go as far as to describe two faces of 
Kemalist Turkish nationalism, one inclusive and one exclusive.10 However, for the 
vast majority of scholarly work Kemalist nationalism is widely characterised as a 
civic nationalism that eventually transformed and incorporated some ethnic 
elements. They usually support their claim of the ‘civic’ character of Kemalism on 
two grounds. Firstly, they cite article 88 of the 1924 Constitution that dictated that 
‘the inhabitants of Turkey are considered as Turks by virtue of citizenship 
irrespective of religious and racial differences’11 as evidence of the inclusiveness of 
the Turkish national identity.  Secondly, scholars illustrate their claim for the civic 
6 
 
type of nationalism by quoting the -what came to become- the national slogan of the 
Republic ‘Ne mutlu Türküm diyene’ (How happy is the one who says, ‘I am Turk’) 
coined by Mustafa Kemal. This phrase encapsulates Ernest Renan’s civic view of the 
nation as a ‘daily plebiscite’ highlighting the voluntary choice for an association with 
a nation. Thus the Kemalist form of Turkish nationalism is widely conceived by the 
vast majority of scholarly work as civic in origin, rather than ethnic. In this paper we 
shall move beyond this distinction that rather obscures than reveal the nature and 
the characteristics of a certain form of nationalism. 
The adherents of Kemalism were French-educated scholars that professedly 
pursue a civic conceptualization of the nation. Two of the most influential ideologues 
of the early twentieth century are undoubtedly Yusuf Akcura(oglu) and Ziya Gokalp. 
Yusuf Akcura (1876-1935) in his 1904 essay, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (three versions/ types 
of politics) presented the ideological debate that was going on for a while among 
intellectuals of the declining Ottoman Empire.12  Ottomanism, originated in the 
1860s, was the idea that the mosaic of communities will fuse into one Ottoman 
citizenry if all the subjects of the Empire would be equal.  The second one was 
Islamism that was based on the idea that a regeneration of the Ottoman state was 
lying in return to Islamic values and law.  Finally, the third current was Turkism. 
The question of race was central in the work of Akcura. 
Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) was probably the most significant ideologue in the 
shaping of the Turkish nationalist project. The work of the prolific Turkish 
intellectual was highly influenced by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim in his 
conceptualisation of culture and civilisation and the ideas of progress. Same as the 
most eminent western sociologists, Durkheim’s work is underpinned with the 
Eurocentric binary distinction of modern and traditional societies.13 This distinction 
is the central basis upon which Gokalp developed his understanding of culture and 
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civilisation. While in western world progress is a natural route, in the non-western 
world progress will be achieved only by adopting western ideas and values. Ziya 
Gokalp urged the compatibility of Turkish nationalism, Islamic culture and western 
civilization. In doing so, he considered western civilization as more broad than 
Christianity. He considered that religion constitutes the culture of a society. So Islam 
is simply the culture of the society and not the civilisation. The understanding of 
civilization and culture as separate entities paved the way to argue for the 
compatibility of civilization and culture and in particular Western civilization and 
Islamic culture.  
Gokalp’s ideas have long been perceived as downgrading racism by promoting 
cultural nationalism.14 Literature on Gokalp has emphatically rejected any racist 
connotations that attributed to his work and theory. His ‘sociological’ definition of 
the nation held that ‘nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political, or voluntary 
group or association. Nation is a group composed of men and women who have gone 
through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in language, 
religion, morality, and aesthetics. The Turkish folk express the same idea by simply 
saying: “The one whose language is my language, and whose faith is my faith, is of 
me.” Men (sic) want to live together, not with those who carry the same blood in their 
veins, but with those who share the same language and the same faith. Our human 
personality is not our physical body but our mind and soul.”15 This quote has been 
cited in order to support the view that Gokalp was anti-racist and advocator of a 
voluntarily, civic approach to nationalism. Though on a number of occasions, Gokalp 
attempted to synthesize the currents of Islam and Turkism in the ideological debates, 
this position assumed the existence of the race that was only temporarily and 
instrumentally omitted.   
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Yet, Gokalp’s ideology is being developed within a context shaped by pure 
Eurocentric and racist understanding of world history. This racist understanding is 
often explicit in his writings. For instance, Gokalp writing on Western imperialism 
put forward a pure racist argument for explaining imperial expansion. Gokalp held 
that ‘as the black and red races were inferior in terms of intelligence and skill, the 
white master could not make enough fortune. In order to be a good worker in today’s 
standard of agriculture and industry, it is necessary to have a high level of 
civilization’.16 Gokalp’s ideological reading of history places the emphasis on culture 
and civilization at the expense of economic arguments.   
The global racial hierarchy was not eroded even by the occupation of the 
Ottoman capital by British, French and Italian troops in accordance with the 
Armistice of Mudros. It is worth emphasising the British view of the Turkish 
perception of race during the occupation of Istanbul between 1918 and 1923. The 
British occupiers reported that “though the Allied Powers were Christians, they were 
respected as race apart and not be thought of as ‘Giaours’.”17 This perceived respect 
of the ‘white race’ of the occupiers is striking given the odious situation of the foreign 
occupation.  
Following the departure of the last Greek soldiers from Anatolian soil on 15 
September 1922, the ceasefire of 11 October and the evacuation of eastern Thrace 
by the Greek army, the Lausanne peace conference opened. While the conference 
maintained suspense over the conclusion of peace, the year 1923 marked the 
establishment of the basic institutions, as well as the policies, of the new Turkey. 
During this time, Mustafa Kemal developed his critique of the economic 
backwardness of his country and its Islamic culture, and introduced his main goal 
as how to achieve western standards of political and economic management, in other 
words ‘to make Turkey European’.  This consists of a totally Eurocentric approach 
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that neglects the fact that the concept of ‘Europe’ has change dramatically over time.  
Mustafa Kemal’s understanding of Turkishness can be connected to an earlier 
debate, which centred around the Young Turk revolution of 1908.  
The idea of Turkishness, or Turkism as it was first discussed, was widely 
inserted in the Ottoman Empire from the Russian émigrés after the Young Turk 
revolution in 1908.18 The Pan-Turkish program envisaged a unification of the Turkic 
people on the basis of common historical roots. One of the most significant 
institutions founded at that period was the Turkish Hearths (Turk Ocaklari). The 
Turkish Hearths, an organization close to the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP), was an effective organ in the applied ‘Turkification’ process. Still, gradually 
these Pan-Turkish aspirations were losing momentum and the Turkish current of 
ideology started focusing on Anatolia.19 However, Kemalism should be understood as 
a sect from the Young Turks movement. The ideology of the Young Turks movement 
is considered as the continuity of trends propagating Eurocentric modernisation 
ideas that were developed in the Ottoman Empire at least since the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  
The Turkification project proceed by Kemalism sought to create an ethnically 
homogeneous Turkey. The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty the document that marked 
the birth of the Turkish Republic arranged the Republic’s ethnic composition of the 
population in two ways. Firstly, it has provisions that formally recognized Christians 
(Armenian and Greek) and Jews as minorities in Turkey. However, Turkish 
delegation during the negotiation process insisted on refusing to attribute any 
distinct status for non-Turkish Muslims. This omission was the prelude of the 
Turkification project in the early days of the Republic that was aiming to assimilate 
the Muslim communities of Turkey.20 The second significant provision for the 
composition of the population was the population exchange between Turkey and 
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Greece. It should be considered as an integral part of the Turkification process 
preached by Kemalist ideology. This forced and legally institutionalised bilateral 
population exchange is widely discussed as the epitome of an ethnic population 
policy. Therefore, it is not surprising that by that time in German press the growing 
debate on Ataturk’s policies and reforms attempted to understand them in 
connection to the Nazis’ principle of ethnic homogeneity. The perception of Turkey’s 
‘’ethnically homogeneous’’ success story appears in the Nazi public discourse during 
the interwar period. Being against multi-ethnic entities Nazi commentators praised 
the so-called ethnic cleansing of Anatolia calling for adaptation to ‘Turkish methods’ 
for a solution to the minority questions.21 Yet, an overwhelming majority of scholarly 
work on Kemalist policies of assimilation have long considered them as anti-racist 
and diametrically opposite to segregation policies.22  
The Turkification project as a part of Mustafa Kemal’s modernisation process 
has been essentially conceptualised upon a racist and Eurocentric basis. Ataturk 
held the view that the new Turkey should cut all its “Eastern/ Muslim” origins adrift 
and define itself as part of the “White/ Western” civilization. He tried to prove this in 
many different ways for the rest of his life. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne 
sought to convince the British, French and Italian delegates that the Ankara 
government had nothing in common with the “old Eastern/ Muslim Turk” 
represented by the Ottoman Empire.  Hence, the new Turkey, from the start, 
identified itself directly and immediately with the history, culture and perceptions of 
the western world, claiming a total break with the Ottoman and Islamic past. By 
1925 an independent Turkish Republic was firmly established with its new western-
type institutions propagating a militantly secular modernising ideology. A completely 
new social order was created under the rule of a small secular military elite. The 
events of these early years mark an important watershed in the development of 
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Turkish state ideology, which is still dominating most aspects of the Turkish state 
and society.23  
Since the early 1930s the administrative apparatus had been using ‘race’ as 
an evaluative criterion for Turkish citizens.24 There were numerous occasions where 
the ‘ethnic Turks’ were treated as ‘first-class’ citizens while cases regarding citizens 
from the Republic’s various minorities were dealt with prejudice and discrimination. 
It is worth noting that in 1935 the terms ‘Turkish blood’ and ‘Turkish ethnicity’ were 
being used interchangeably in official documents.25  
The racist component of Kemalism is elucidated as practice and discourse in 
various policies and speeches delivered by ruling CHP cadres.26 At a valuation of the 
Kemalist reforms, a report prepared for the 1938 CHP conference lays out the 
pertinence of the modernisation project to the Turkish race. It stated that both 
Ataturk and the nation being ‘’in constant contact and aware both of the march of 
events that the progress of civilization’’ they determined “what it was necessary to 
adopt and what to abandon in order for Turkey to become a modern state and the 
Turkish nation to take its place as the first in the history of the world’’ by ‘’leveraging 
the capabilities and character of the Turkish race”.27  
 
Turkish History Thesis: Inventing the long way back 
The 1930s Kemalist racist practice found a pseudo-scientific basis in the Turkish 
History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi). The ’Turkish History Thesis’ attempted to 
scientifically support and legitimately popularise the racist ideas propagated by the 
Turkish Ojaks since the early 1910s. The despicable assertions of the Turkish 
History Thesis were a simple elaboration of Turkish Ojaks ideology. Like the Turkish 
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Ojaks, the Turkish History Thesis placed Turkish race at the root of human 
civilisation and language. 
The institution of the Turkish Ojaks has been the most effective channel of 
spreading Kemalist ideology to the population. It was founded in 1912 with the 
fourfold mission: “to reinforce the ethnic conscience among the Turks; to elevate their 
social and intellectual level; to purify their language; to increasing their economic 
prosperity”. Rechid Safvet28 in his lecture on 7 June 1929 to the Turanian Society of 
Budapest29 noted that with Kemal Ataturk Turks had passed to the third and last 
period in the three required stages of national formation. According to Safvet, ‘The 
Turks had always and profoundly the consciousness and the pride of their origins, 
their ascendances, so much that there was almost no leader among them that has 
stood with honour to trace back their ancestors to Altai, the birthplace of the white 
race itself’.30  
After establishing the Turkish ‘race’ as a ‘white’ race, the Ojaks claimed that 
in ‘’11th century BC the word 'turk' was synonymous with 'noble' and ‘superior’ at 
central Asia’’.31 They stated that even the great Genghis Khan had proudly referred 
to his Turkish ancestry. The Ojaks traced the consciousness of nationality itself, in 
the sense that the French Revolution gave, and in which it was understood later in 
the rest of Europe, this conscience was awakened for the first time in Turkey at the 
beginning of 19th century. The ideology of Turkish Hearths had been heavily 
influenced by the work of Ziya Gokalp. It was him who made the ancient claim for 
the land and the affinity toward Western civilisation. In Gokalp’s understanding 
Western civilisation portrayed as a continuation of the ancient Mediterranean 
civilisation. According to Gokalp the ‘ancient Turks were among the earliest founders 
of that Mediterranean civilization’ and it was only that ‘after attacks that they were 
forced to move to Far East only temporarily.’32 Likewise, the Turkish Hearths 
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propagated the worldview that the Turkish nation laid the foundation of the 
Pelasgian, Etruscan, Chaldean, Egyptian and Chinese civilizations.33 Furthermore, 
it was also proclaimed that the Turkish language was one of the first languages 
spoken widely in the world, possessed all the elements of a language that is truly 
flexible and modern.34All these outrageous claims on race were based on Gokalp’s 
work and systematically promulgated to the Turkish population through the 
numerous activities and publications of the Turkish Hearths. In 1930 Turkish Ojaks 
had 257 departments throughout the Republic with 32,000 members. The Turkish 
Hearths through their publications and their social and cultural activities played a 
crucial role for the implementation of the Kemalist cultural policies. 
Ziya Gokalp classified the Turkish ‘race’ as the ‘Altai’. He was convinced that 
future comparative studies on civilisation would “show the nature of the relation of 
the Turks to the groups called ‘Altai’ or ‘Mongolian race’’’. Gokalp asserted that ‘to 
classify Turks who are fairer and more handsome than Aryans with the ‘yellow race’ 
has no scientific foundation, as the supposition of a linguistic unity among the ethnic 
groups, usually called the ‘Altai race’, is far from being proven. It is very probable 
that all of these groups all belonging to the Far Eastern civilisation. If this is so, our 
only affinity with Finno-Ugrians, Tunguz, and the Mongols consists of a common 
sharing of the same civilization of our domination over them for a long period. It is 
quite possible that through such an association certain similarities in language have 
taken place.’35 A decade later the research conducted under the auspices of the 
Turkish Historical Society provided pseudo-scientific coverage for these claims. 
In the early 1930s Kemal Ataturk sought to legitimise these theories through 
the production of scholarly work. Under the patronage of Ataturk, the Turkish 
Historical Society (initially as Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti and then as Türk Tarih 
Kurumu) founded as a body of the Turkish Ojaks in 1930. One of the founders of the 
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Ojaks, Yusuf Akcura served as the President of the Society until his death in 1935. 
Through a series conferences and publications, the Turkish History Thesis that gave 
a sharp prominence to the role of race in defining the nation was established. The 
issues of the official journal of the society Belleten, conveying the official history 
thesis, yield insights on official perceptions of race.  
In 1932, the first Turkish Historical Congress was convened in Ankara with 
the task of proving the theory that the Turks were indeed a white Aryan race 
originating in Central Asia where ‘Western civilization’ was assumed to have 
originated.36 The second Turkish Historical Congress met in Istanbul in 1937 before 
a major international audience, where further desperate steps were taken to prove 
that the Turks were indeed a central part of the white European race. Eugene 
Pittard,37 the Swiss anthropologist whose work was perceived and practiced as a 
racist account of humanity, not only participated but was announced as the 
honorary president.38 In a state-sponsored systematic effort missionary scientists 
employed to prove the identicalness of the Turkish race and the ‘white’ race by 
verifying that ancient Turks were the ancestors of modern European. In doing so, a 
selective reconstruction of historical events took place in order to suppress the 
Ottoman past and pursue Kemalism’s political goal. In this way, Ottoman and 
Islamic principles became professed not only as an obstacle to progress but as its 
militant adversary. 
The central theme of the Turkish History Thesis was the rejection of the 
Ottoman-Islamic past by glorifying the -invented- pre-Islamic past of the Turks. The 
sacred bond between language and nation is a recurring theme in the works 
nationalist scholars of the late 18th and 19th centuries. Eric Hobsbawm highlighting 
the ‘invented traditions’ as sine qua non practice in the nation-building process, 
states that they attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.39 The 
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suitably tailored discourse normally concerns a wide range of constructions and 
distortions found in established disciplinary knowledge. Thus Hobsbawm held that 
the study of ‘invention of tradition’ crosses the boundaries of history and should be 
interdisciplinary. The case of the racist ‘invented tradition’ proliferated by Turkish 
History Thesis is not an exception to this rule. 
Following the articulation of the Turkish History Thesis, scholarly work in 
three disciplines - Anthropology, Archaeology and Linguistics – was instrumentally 
produced in order to verify the Turkish History Thesis.40 Numerous archaeological 
projects were commissioned with the purpose to research Hittite and ‘prove’ their 
Turkishness. Archaeological excavations and research were expected to corroborate 
all the major themes of the Turkish History Thesis, that is, the Turkishness of 
Anatolia, a secular history purified by Islamic tendencies, and equality between 
Turkish and European civilizations.41 The founding of museums was also an inherent 
part of the large-scale project of ‘inventing the historical tradition’.42 The Museum of 
Anatolian Civilizations and the Ethnography Museum of Ankara were established in 
the early decades of the Republic to display the new archaeological discoveries to the 
wider public.43 
Anthropological studies were first initiated with the establishment of the 
“Anthropology Research Center of Turkey” as part of the Medical School of Istanbul 
University in 1925. After the university reform it was placed under the roof of the 
Faculty of Sciences, as a separate Department of Anthropology. In 1935 it was 
renamed ‘Turkish Institute for Anthropology and Ethnology’ and was transferred to 
the School of Languages, History and Geography (Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi) in 
Ankara University. These changes signify the specialization of the discipline. The 
Center published the Journal of Turkish Review of Anthropology (Turk Antropoloji 
Mecmuası) from 1925 untill 1939. The journal had close relations with the Ministry 
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of Education with the Ministers being the honorary presidents of the journal. The 
official state approval and support of the Journal makes it a kind of think tank of the 
Republic. 44 The published contributions elaborated a theoretical ground upon which 
the racist component of Turkish nationalism flourished.45  
The goal of the anthropological research was twofold. On the one hand, it 
attempted to establish a ‘racial continuity’ in Anatolia since the Hittites and on the 
other, to prove the whiteness of the Turkish ‘race’. The work of Afet Inan, the adopted 
daughter of Kemal Ataturk, acquired an authoritative status. Working at Geneva 
University under the supervision of Eugene Pittard, measured a wide range of 
skeletons in order to support her claims. Inan was also one of the main contributors 
of the Turk Tarihinin Ana Hatlari (Main Features of Turkish History) volume where 
the Turkish History thesis was first elaborated. This 605-page book served as a 
source for the production of the history textbooks and curricula in public education. 
The aim of the book, as laid out in its introduction, was “to reveal the mysteries of 
the Turkish genius and moral character, to demonstrate to the Turk himself his own 
uniqueness and power and to explain that our national development is embedded in 
deep racial roots.”46 Overall, anthropological research undertaken during the 
formative decades of the Republic put forward racist arguments in order to support 
the Turkish History Thesis. 
Finally, a vital part of the Eurocentric Kemalist project was linguistic 
engineering. This multiple-step process took the form of language reform marked a 
violent rupture from the past. On 1 November 1928 the new alphabet, a modified 
version of the Latin alphabet, replaced the Arabic scripture. The adoption of the new 
Turkish alphabet aimed at facilitating communication with the West.47 In 1932 the 
Turkish Language Society was established and the terminology of race was employed. 
A special commission was set up in order to “renovate the Turkish language by 
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discarding foreign words and locutions which have been adopted at different epochs 
and substituting in their place genuine and original Turkish equivalents, so that 
Turkish may regain its pristine ‘personality.’”48 The purification of the Turkish 
lexicon and grammar from Persian and Arabic words was a part of the -negation of 
Ottoman past- process.49 These radical changes came to be called the Language 
Revolution (Dil Devrimi).  
The commission carried out linguistic research for supporting two 
fundamental Kemalist claims. First, through comparative studies of languages 
sought to prove the unity of Turkish and Indo-European languages. The second aim 
was even more grandiosely outrageous than the first. Through establishing a tie 
between Sumerian and Turkish language, it endeavoured to assert that Turkish was 
the first language in human history. This assertion was eventually dropped in late 
193Os.50 Ataturk has imposed on the commission a ‘stupendous task, the magnitude 
of which would surely appal any recognised philologist, though it does not seem to 
daunt the ardent and self-complacent Turk, whose findings are not likely to carry 
much weight beyond the boundaries of his native land.’ 51 
In 1935 the ‘Sun language theory’ (Güneş Dil Teorisi) was launched. It sought 
to prove that Turkish language was the first in human history and the root of all 
Semitic and Indo-European languages. It was based upon a heliocentric view of the 
origin of civilization and human languages; the theory claimed that the Turkish 
language was the language which all civilized languages derived from. The 
association between the sun and language was founded in archaeological discoveries 
of the solar disks. The symbol of the sun disk thus indicated the Hittite prehistoric 
past of Turkey.52This extravagant claim for the language should also be understood 
through the Eurocentric essence and nature of Kemalism. Sumerian and Hittite were 
considered as ancient Turkish languages in order to establish a racial claim to 
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Western civilisation. In 1933, Ataturk himself was convinced ‘European languages 
and civilisation had their origins among the Altai Turks many thousands of years 
B.C. and, in particular, that the Hittites were of Turkish stock’.53  
The education was developed around these ideas. The interface between 
culture and education is demonstrated also in 1935 when the Ministry of Education 
(Maarif Vekaleti) was renamed the Ministry of Culture (Kultur Bakanligi).54 Since the 
early 1930s the official history textbooks have been rewritten according to the 
Kemalist ideology in education promulgating the ‘Turkish History Thesis’.55The use 
of this Thesis and its major themes had provided the framework where school 
textbook were structured and developed throughout the history of the Republic.  
Dr. Resit Galip56, a Minister of Education who showed special interest in the 
linguistic and historical claims of Kemalism, summarised ten main points and 
themes underlying the official history in the 1930s. “Firstly, the cradle of mankind is 
Central Asia. Life first began and evolved there. Secondly, the world’s first civilization 
was established in Central Asia by the Turkish race, the original people and first 
inhabitants. Thirdly, anthropologically, the brachycephalic Alpine type was 
representing the Turkish race. Fourthly, the large-scale migrations resulting from 
the contact of Europe and Asia took place from east to west, not from west to east. 
Fifthly, the Turks spread to different territories in wholesale migrations, the principal 
causes of which were the droughts which occurred at various epochs in Central Asia 
with increasing severity; they established ancient civilizations in those places. These 
civilizations, with a common source and creator, developed according to the 
particular conditions of the new surroundings. Sixthly, the Turkish language is the 
mother tongue. The correct solution of philological problems is impossible without 
taking into consideration the paleontology, archaic structure and formations of the 
Turkish language. Seventhly, as in the case of ancient civilizations (wrongly referred 
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to as Islamic civilization) the role of foundation and achievement in the civilization of 
more recent epochs belongs to the Turks. Eighthly, in view of the fact that its climate 
most nearly approached the climate of Central Asia, and that from the geographical 
point of view it formed a bridge leading to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, the Aegean and the 
continent of Europe, the plain of Anatolia became Turkicised towards the end of the 
Paleolithic age, and this process spread with maximum rapidity in the chalcolithic 
(sic) age; by the end of the Selcuk era the currents of invasion and immigration which 
had flowed for thousands of years had made Anatolia, from the racial point of view, 
a stage representing Turkism in its purest and most unalloyed form, to such an 
extent that the ancient history of Turkism could be traced as much in Anatolia as in 
Central Asia. The ninth main theme was the inability of the Turkish nation during 
the last few centuries to fulfil its duty of historical guide in the progress and 
development of the world. This is an obstructive feature connected with obstructive 
caused and factors, though the racial setting which sets off the valuable and worthy 
jewels, is sound. Once the factors of obstructive decadence were removed by a 
process of revolution, the Turkish nation will once more resume its definite and 
essential duty of lighting the path of the undying historical work of civilization and 
the progress of mankind. This may be expressed in the formula: ‘The Turkish nation 
has done, can do and will do’. Finally, the tenth major theme underpinning the new 
Turkish history was that because the analysis of the foregoing principles showed 
that, whereas the Ottoman theory of history neglected and denied the nation, the 
theory of Mustafa Kemal took the nation alone as its one subject, studies it, delves 
into it, makes it known, and selects formulae relating to its future exclusively from 
its history and past life. On the basis of this theory, nobody could say: ‘My origin 
goes back to Noah,’ or ‘I am descended from Ali or Veli,’ and in this way establish an 
ancestry by arranging his pedigree; nobody can establish false claims to pride of race 
if he ignores the Turkish nation. The Turkish nation alone is the foundation and 
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origin.”57 This lengthy quote encapsulates the impact of the 'Turkish History Thesis' 
and the 'Sun Language Theory' on education. The scientifically fabricated theories 
that sought to establish the Turkish race as the founder of the Anatolian civilisation 
shaped also the official discourse on the non-Turkish Muslims like the Kurds. The 
forced assimilation, or Turkification, hence aimed to assimilate Kurds, a race that 
according to the above mentioned theories were originally Turks who had forgotten 
their Turkishness, into the Turkish nation.  
 
Conclusion 
Racism advocated by Kemalist was by no means a novelty in the 1930s. Racism was 
a widespread practice and theory worldwide. The uniqueness of the Kemalist project 
is the extent and abysmal impact on Turkish society. In a recently leaked document, 
the US Ambassador in Turkey in often-quoted observation questions the status 
reconciliation of Turkey with its past. He notes that ‘the study of history and practice 
of historiography in the Republic of Turkey is subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears, 
and mandatory gross distortions’.58 It is now more than 90 years since the 
establishment of the Republic, and in an ever more complex and impersonal society, 
the limitations and contradictions of Turkish national identity are coming to the fore 
more and more. As Turkey moves deeper into the twenty-first century, a sense of 
confusion about ethnicity, nationhood, religion, secularity and the country’s role in 
the world is very pronounced. The legacy of the practices of the early Republic lies in 
a continued emphasis by Turkish scholars on the ‘civic’ character of Kemalism. The 
Eurocentric essence of the distinction of forms of nationalism in good ‘Western –civic’ 
and bad ‘Eastern –ethnic’ urges the debate to move beyond these labels that obscure 
more than they reveal.  
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Whereas the relationship between nationalism and racism has attracted much 
attention recently, the case of Kemalism has not been critically evaluated. Any study 
of the issue would require developing an understanding of the Eurocentric 
conceptualisation of the nation. The discourse developed in the 1990s on the 
formation and division between ‘White’ and ‘Black’ Turks, the Kurdish issue, 
treatment of other minorities and contemporary phenomena of xenophobia and racial 
discrimination cannot be fully understood without grasping the racist elements of 
Kemalism. 
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